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then, who are privileged to toil for the non-privileged, and especially to see to it that a fair and open field for discussion and reform is maintained. Here and there we have evidences of a desire on the part of the privileged classes to hem in and limit freedom of discussion, and to oppress those who would show us the way to better things. One of the strongest ethical obligations resting upon us at the present time is to spread the light which we have, and to fight with all our powers to maintain a wide open way for those who would bring us a fullness of light which we do not now enjoy.

RICHARD T. ELY.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

THE ETHICS OF EXPANSION.

THE discussion of the ethics of the new expansion policy of the United States seems to have suffered much from uncertainty in its fundamental assumptions. By what criterion are we to judge the ethics of larger human relations? Some quote Scripture or other venerable authority, only to be met by a counter-quotation, and the effort to determine who has wrested the Scripture to his own destruction brings back the original question. Others apply the rules governing individual relations and construe the commands against killing and theft into prohibitions of war and conquest. But are the cases really analogous? This is the original question in another form. As usual, we make no progress by elaborating primary equivocations. Very much recent argument seems to have been of this character. This is my excuse for calling brief attention to certain primary truths which are generally accepted as principles and regularly ignored in their practical applications.

Wherever there is life there is growth, and wherever there is growth there must sooner or later be competition. Inevitably the stronger forms of life displace the weaker and progress is the result. Progress is nothing else, can be nothing else in nature, than the substitution of the more efficient for the less efficient forms of life. This process, too, is one in which we

have no choice but to acquiesce. Inefficiency can neither long maintain itself nor be long maintained against efficiency. This law is as universal as it is inexorable, and all other vital principles are its servants, never its rivals.

It is as useless to speculate about the ethics of this universal competition as to speculate about the ethics of gravitation. So far as we can see, the process is non-ethical, altogether transcending the limits of moral obligation. But ethical or not, it is absolutely universal. The notion that other laws are opposed to this and tend to displace it, is utterly unfounded. They are but refinements of it, and exist and develop solely on condition that they increase its efficiency. Ethical phenomena, therefore, like all other special phenomena, are resolvable into more fundamental elements, which are non-ethical or super-ethical.

Strictly subsidiary to this fundamental process of selective competition stands the seemingly opposite process of association. Individuals cringing by a common impulse before a superior foe, find themselves masters by virtue of accidental coöperation, and the experience, repeated by accident, becomes systematized into a process of nature. Association becomes permanent and evolves the necessary adaptations and instincts. Where these instincts come from we need not stop to inquire. They come as other instincts come, appearing where they are needed and developing in power and precision in proportion to the permanency and importance of the interests which they conserve. The question for us is, what are the interests of which the moral instincts are the appointed guardians?

The answer is plain. These interests are group interests. The formation of groups, which we have seen is a natural result of the struggle for existence, requires certain concessions on the part of individuals and guarantees of mutual forbearance. Without these there could be no coöperation and no increase of efficiency in this way. These concessions and restraints the moral instincts are invoked to secure. Their field is the field of association. That and that only. Where there is no coöperation, no mutual dependence and trust, there is no moral relation; and, correspondingly, where relations of dependence and coöperation are necessarily few and slight the competitive

struggle is but little limited by moral obligation. The important fact for us to remember is that moral relations are not universal, but strictly special and limited. Beyond these limits the moral instincts are neither potent nor legitimate, because they do not minister unto life.

It must be confessed that this distinction is not generally recognized and that there is a tendency to assume that all relations are potentially moral. The reason is that we are in an intensely dynamic stage of social evolution. Of all the devices for furthering competitive efficiency, association is the latest to find extensive application. The development of muscular strength, fleetness, cunning and numberless other advantages, is still going on, but it has passed into an advanced stage of diminishing returns. The limpet has not improved perceptibly in millions of years, while the adaptations which characterize the lion or the antelope remain essentially static for milleniums. But association seems to be one of nature's recent discoveries, and the new principle is being exploited with feverish precipitancy. In this unprecedentedly dynamic development the capital of accumulated social instincts is constantly inadequate. Coöperation is being extended, organization refined and dependence made more absolute, while as yet the slowly evolving sympathies lag behind. Society is justly anxious lest its moral resources prove insufficient and involve its vast undertakings in bankruptcy. Rights and duties are pushed into the foreground of consciousness and are thought of as universal relations. The gods, hitherto exempt from moral relations, become their chief exponent. Philosophers, under the influence of the dominant anxiety, speculate on the ethics of the universe, while benevolent souls turn vegetarian and wonder how a righteous God can let pelicans catch fish. Social necessities are conserved by the temporary oversight of scientific verities.

It is at such times of exceptional ethical prepossession that speculative statesmen declare that "all men are by nature equal and are endowed with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." It matters not that "Nature, red in tooth and claw with ravine, shrieks against their creed;" the all-engrossing care of their age; the moral

prepossession of men, absorbed in a mighty work of social construction, projects itself upon all phenomena out to the utmost confines of thought, and becomes a fantastic theory of nature. Nature is beneficent and rights go hand in hand with life; society is based on voluntary contract and citizenship is terminable at will; "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," etc. It is unnecessary to enumerate farther or to discuss these propositions. Our four years debate with those who took them too seriously is too painfully fresh in memory to incline us to reopen the question. Nor has the conclusion then reached, that social obligations were not terminable at will or governmental authority dependent upon the consent of the governed, been reversed by subsequent experience.

I am not disparaging the moral instincts or deriding the founders of our state. We shall do well if we perform our task as well as they did theirs, and may be thankful if our prepossessions prove as serviceable to us as did those to which they owed their singleness of purpose. Moral obligation is a tremendous reality, and it is still the chief concern of society to strengthen its hold upon the minds of men. But the field of moral obligation is strictly limited, and we gain nothing for morals by claiming for them a fictitious universality. Where there is no combination for competitive efficiency there is no moral relation. The ethics of evolution is a conception precisely comparable to the music of the spheres. Because men keep time to music they imagine that the planets do the same; because the moral instincts regulate society men imagine that they regulate the universe.

So long as this confusion remains, however, it must necessarily modify our action. The moral instincts are not to be ignored even when they are out of place. Instincts are sensitive things and are greatly weakened by action in violation of their behests. All such concessions to misapplied scruples are something of an impairment of vital efficiency, but to weaken these instincts would impair that efficiency in an even higher degree. The action of all competing groups is therefore hesitant and inconsistent. When the moral instincts, exercised in individual

relations, interpose too strong an objection, the group forbears to take a competitive advantage, and when the disadvantage of this action is apparent there is a reaction and the moral instincts are crowded aside. But, significantly enough, society never admits that it is doing violence to its moral instincts. The necessity of treating them with deference in cases where they are not pertinent, results in an ingenious system of pretexts and subterfuges by which their integrity is preserved in normal relations. Hence result those strange moral paradoxes to be met with in the history of all efficient societies. Bismarck said that in individual relations Englishmen were patterns of honesty, but that their diplomacy was a tissue of lies. Yet the English recognize no conscious double standard. The strength of their moral instincts and the skill with which they evade them in non-ethical relations are equally conditions of their national efficiency.

This brings us to the main question at issue. What is the ethical character of international relations? No answer can be given that is wholly comprehensive, but the general truth is clear. The relation between groups formed for competitive efficiency is primarily a competitive relation. There is no such dependence between them as exists between individuals within the group, nor does forbearance tend in any such degree to promote collective efficiency. The struggle for race supremacy is but a phase of that deeper conflict which we have seen to be universal in nature, and it cannot be condemned without condemning the whole process of nature. In this struggle, coöperation and all its attendant instincts are but incidents, strategic moves, dictated by considerations of expediency.

Like every phase of the struggle for existence, race competition is constructive. It develops not only increasingly hardy and efficient groups, but a progressive consolidation of groups looking towards an ultimate synthesis. With this tendency the higher social instincts are in universal accord. All look forward to a "parliament of man, a federation of the world." But it is urged that this synthesis should be voluntary and not coerced, that it should be accomplished by federation rather than conquest. That means that we should wait till the social

instincts of men are sufficiently developed to draw us all together. But this is impossible under the existing conditions of social progress. The social instincts do not precede social experience, they proceed from it. Individuals unite from necessity and only after long adaptation does necessity pass over into choice. Whatever may be true of the future, federation is as yet merely a by-product of war. How soon would the Swiss cantons, the German States or the American colonies have united in pursuit of peaceful advantage? Even if the nations of mankind should at last effect a peaceable union, it could be little else than a potential conquest, an intelligent forecast of the inevitable outcome. Such a forecast implies a long experience in vast societies with world-wide interests, and these must be the product of conquest. It is impossible to believe that even the highest races have the intelligence to recognize the ascendancies and elect the affinities which must govern the future. Still less can we believe that the uncivilized races will develop that intelligence within any calculable period. Must we wait their time and leave them in festering disorganization in the midst of an organized humanity? It should not and it will not be.

We are confronted, therefore, with an ultimate synthesis of humanity, perhaps not far remote as such things go, the main lines of which we can already trace. Like every adjustment effected by nature, it will be based, not upon the equality but upon the inequality of its component parts. Some race, more virile and constructive than the rest, will get the ascendancy. Other races, though nominally independent, will take their cue from this, recognizing at first by vehement denials and then by sullen acquiescence a hegemony which will at last pass over into automatic and even enthusiastic allegiance as time brings its inevitable adaptations. In attaining this result the weak races of the temperate zones seem destined to extinction, those of the tropics to subjection. What else should or can be the fate of inferiority?

I know there is a feeling in some quarters that all this should somehow be prevented, that venerable civilizations should be

preserved and vanishing races artificially protected. There is undoubtedly an element of tragedy in it all. The successive wane of Moorish, Spanish and Romance civilization has its pathetic aspect to which the most relentless rival cannot be insensible. But dying races suffer little and dead races suffer naught. To bewail the process is to misconceive its import and to squander sympathies which spent elsewhere would minister unto life. For happiness, however dependent for the moment on tottering institutions and obsolete adjustments, is ultimately synonymous with adaptation and health. What if Boer or Maori or Castillian be eliminated or lost to view! Will there be less of life where they have been, or that life be less worthy or less human? Is it a loss that the pterodactyle has vanished and that "Nature brings not back the mastodon"? Only those who conceive of the earth as intended for an ethnological museum can regret the progressive displacement of the lower by the higher races of mankind. If it be said that we can educate these races up to our level the reply is that it will not be done, because it is not the economical thing to do. It is vastly easier to displace a feeble stock than to assimilate it upward by education, and if we invest our vital capital in a losing process, a thriftier race will dispossess both our protégés and us.

It is clear that the organization of mankind will be as little hampered in the future as it has been in the past by such considerations as inalienable rights and the consent of the governed. Weakness has everywhere yielded to strength, sullenly and resistingly but inevitably. Yet out of these stern coercions have grown some of the stablest and most efficient governments on earth. It was not with their consent that the Danes passed under the rule of Alfred, or the Welsh under that of Edward. It was not with alacrity that the Southern States renewed their allegiance to the government at Washington. But these governments are stable, efficient and prosperous. They have followed the universal law of social evolution. Coerced into union, that union has become indissoluble through adaptations of structure and feeling effected by experience. Such governments may not be just (I confess I never did know what that word meant) but they rally all sympathies about them and are

enduring monuments of social achievement. Voluntary unions may have some sacerdotal superiority, but it is one not easily translated into terms of efficiency or happiness. Even the union of which we are so proud knew no stability till the compact was ratified by the sword.

If my reasoning is correct the process with which we have here to do, coercive consolidation and the establishment of universal order, is inherently normal and wholesome. Should the United States participate or hold aloof?

It should be apparent from the foregoing pages that the question is primarily one of expediency. We are not estopped by any moral consideration from extending our territory at the expense of Spain or any other power. It is inherently as admissible to subjugate the Philippines with the sword as it is to subjugate France by industrial superiority. The subjugation is not more real or more painful. The question of ways and means is merely one of tactical advantage.

But while we are not restrained by any sweeping moral prohibition, moral factors enter largely into the question of expediency. The first of these factors is the one already referred to, the confusion of moral judgment, the tendency to interpret all relations by the analogy of those more intimate relations with which experience makes us familiar. It is evident that whatever of error is involved in these judgments can only be in the direction of exaggeration, since the less intimate relation is interpreted by the more intimate one. The right of Spain to Cuba is very different from the right of a Spaniard to his Cuban estate, but the tender conscience is at first inclined to assign it equal validity. Our "century of dishonor" in connection with the Indian race is merely a continuous attempt to reconcile sub-ethical relations with full ethical standards. The discovery that these judgments are erroneous does not obviate the necessity of showing deference to the instincts involved, for they are at best scarcely sufficient for the task legitimately required of them, and the least discouragement may have disastrous consequences. The ability to justify necessary action to these somewhat indiscriminating monitors is an indispensable condition of that union of inner forbearance and outward aggressiveness which makes nations great.

Fortunately, the American people is quite equal to all such emergencies. Its readiness to emancipate Cuba from oppression and to confer the blessing of American institutions on the benighted Philippines, and its ability to take such arguments seriously, fully convinced that they are the real ground of its action, are an admirable example of this necessary reconciliation of seemingly incompatible functions. It is idle to object that such devices are disingenuous and illogical. The whole social fabric is a tissue of beneficent fictions, of contradictory instincts specialized for divergent functions and harmonized by pseudo-logic. The veriest tyro in the study of society should know better than to take its logic seriously.

In one respect the moral sense of the American people is peculiarly adapted to this *role* of constructive aggression. Our whole experience has accustomed us to honor dynamic rather than static rights. Our territory has been appropriated, our wealth created and our authority established by our strong arm. When Spain, resting back upon centuries of undisputed possession, passionately declared, "Cuba is ours," she obeyed an impulse born of centuries of status and decay. America challenged this title with characteristic vigor and conviction. No title was valid which did not rest upon power to hold and use in the interests of humanity. And we said it in all conscience, for such is our only title to all we possess. This moral temper which is thus adjusted to the necessities of constructive aggression in a degree peculiarly fits us for the great struggle.

One further moral factor of the greatest importance remains to be considered. I have said that the relation between nations is primarily competitive rather than coöperative, but it is not exclusively so. Relations of forbearance and dependence recognized by each party do exist in varying degrees between nations. I confess that in the great majority of cases these international relations which may be called ethical seem to me extremely rudimentary. No greater tactical blunder could be made than to place serious reliance upon the most of these in practical affairs. If it be argued that with sufficient deference these feelings will grow to the degree necessary to meet all requirements, I reply that this is neither probable nor certainly

desirable. It is in the highest degree unlikely that a peaceful organization of existing human elements into a world society on the basis of the present status, would be either possible or desirable. War, aggression, constructive conquest have not yet done their work. It is scarcely too much to say that a peaceful federation of mankind at the present juncture would be a misfortune, over-burdening the delicate selective agencies working within organized society with the gross, heavy work which should be done by the powerful enginery of race conflict. And as long as that work is not done we must not lose the power or the will to do it. Woe to the nation that unlearns war too soon while as yet cruder and hardier peoples have not done with its schooling and have not learned the scruples that paralyze its rival's arm. The great majority of these incipient moral relations between races are destined to collapse before the stress of race conflict, and, as the feebler contestants are eliminated by incorporation or extinction, the budding sentiments of international comity will blast, which were not destined to bear fruit. There is reason to believe that there will be exceptions to this rule, that some existing international relations will develop into strictly social relations, merging the nations in question in a common social life. Where inner development has proceeded far enough to make such a union stable and efficient, the ethics of such international relations are not open to dispute.

The moral factors that complicate the problem of expediency are thus of a varied character, requiring sometimes restraint, sometimes encouragement, and always tactful management. We can hardly close our inquiry, however, without considering briefly some of the more exclusively prudential factors which enter into the problem. Is our proposed move good strategy?

Three classes of objections are raised. The first have to do with our constitution and its alleged limitations. These questions I shall not discuss, both because a lay opinion is of little value and because I do not imagine the obstacle to be very serious. If the move we are contemplating is important the constitution is not likely to stand in its way. If we cannot amend it we can "interpret" it, which is quite as effectual and a

far more normal method of adaptation. The task now imposed upon our Supreme Court is certainly easy as compared with former tasks, no matter which way the decision must eventually go.

A more serious objection is that based upon the nature of our government and its supposed ideals. We have founded a democracy the essence of which is the participation of all citizens in the duties and privileges of government. The advantages claimed for such a system are two-fold. It prevents tyranny, or the exploitation of society in the interest of a governing class, and it develops the individual by the constant exercise of faculties of a high order. It is interesting to note the *role* played by these arguments.

A century ago the first was considered the sufficient as it was virtually the only argument for democracy. Hatred of tyranny and sublime confidence in the power of the people, clothed with political rights, to avert that dread enemy of mankind is strangely prominent in the writings of our statesmen. The reason is, of course, to be found in contemporary experience. But from the time of John Stuart Mill much less attention has been given to this argument, while the educational function of democracy has risen to unwonted honor. Mill declares it to be more important that a government should educate than that it should maintain order. The same sentiment is vigorously expressed by a well-known writer in the assertion that the best government is not that which governs best but that which produces the best men.

It is hardly too much to say that this shifting in the line of defense is also due to political experience. The first century of democracy has been disappointing. I do not claim that democracy has failed in the United States, though its achievements have been finite, but certainly none of our imitators have even passably succeeded. Even France has probably achieved no substantial amelioration of her social conditions by adopting a popular government. This comparative failure of American democracy is tacitly confessed by one of its ablest defenders in a recent article, in which he argues that we have not yet given it a fair trial and must not throw it overboard.

Under such circumstances we can understand the emphasis upon the other argument. Democracy is a very congenial idea to certain temperaments and it is not likely to be readily abandoned. But whatever its merits, the argument now urged in its defense must be received with caution. Democracy, like any other social institution, educates men in that it adapts them to its own requirements. The assertion that it makes men or that it educates men implies that it fits men for requirements in general. But however near the truth this may happen to be, it is in principle false. All such education is special rather than general. Exercise in politics fits a man for politics, but not necessarily for other functions. The value of this education will depend primarily upon the necessity of these functions. If democracy is to be the government of the future, then to educate men for it is worth some blundering, but if not, then men had better be educated for what is actually in store for them. I am not disparaging democracy, as I shall presently make clear, but I much prefer to drive with the horse before the cart. To urge that a government be retained which does not govern well on the ground that it is an educator, is to overlook the fact that by the inexorable law of functional adaptation such a government must become a miseducator. To plead for the retention of democracy on the ground that it makes good citizens is like pleading for war on the ground that it makes good soldiers. All social functions and activities tend to fit men for their exercise, and in this respect democracy can have no preëminence. To say that the best government is the one that makes the best men is merely reasoning in a circle, since the best men are merely those that are the best adapted to the conditions, political and social, of their existence.

The criterion of government is the same as that of all other things, adaptation to the conditions of existence. That arrangement is best, here as everywhere, which is most workable, most efficient, best able to resist destroying forces, and those men are best who are best adapted to these arrangements. To assign to one government the function of establishing order and to another that of educating men is quite beyond our power. The function of government is determined by the ne-

cessities of human society, necessities to which it owes its being and which are sufficiently known to us to put that function beyond doubt. Government must maintain that equilibrium between liberty and control which will conduce to the highest social efficiency. It must not sacrifice efficiency in the interest of man-making any more than in the interest of machine-making, and the one is as possible as the other. The test of government is, first, last and always, its ability to govern, to perpetuate itself by perpetuating the society committed to its keeping.

We are told that either the Philippines must be admitted to full participation in our government (a proposal happily not widely entertained), or the whole theory of democracy falls. Apparently that would be about the extent of the damage. It is not plain why our government should not go on otherwise much as before. The exclusion from political rights is not of a kind to prove insidious, nor is the Anglo-Saxon inclined to carry out principles to their logical conclusion. Whatever works well in our institutions is likely to be retained.

But it is urged that under the new conditions our institutions will not work well and we shall be forced in the interest of efficiency to adopt an "oligarchical" government like that of England, a necessity only to be averted by sticking to our proper function of making men. Anything so abhorrent to our instincts as an "oligarchy" should not be accepted without careful consideration. It may not be amiss, therefore, to inquire more closely into the nature of those institutions with which we are menaced.

In England as in America there is freedom of speech, freedom of the press and effective education of public opinion. In both there is substantially universal manhood suffrage, representative and responsible government and the amplest guarantee of civil rights. In some of these the advantage is certainly with England, in not one is it on our side. But in England the experts in charge of government are entrusted with a real power of initiative, a trust for which they are held hourly responsible, while in the United States that right of initiative is less centralized and less definite and is coupled with a corres-

pondingly feeble and inefficient responsibility. The English Cabinet can make treaties or declare war on its own motion, while ours can do so only in consultation and with the approval of the Senate, a body with which it is in well-nigh constant feud. But while the former can be overturned in an hour if its action is not approved, the other can browbeat public opinion with impunity to the end of its allotted term. Both governments do, however, in practice, have regard for the popular will and execute its behests. Our own statesmen are notoriously deferential, too often mere fawning puppets of public opinion. On the other hand no government on earth is more effectively controlled by public opinion than that of England. The men who can alienate an Empire of their own volition, cannot build a torpedo-boat or appoint a postmaster without the consent of the people. They are untrammelled, but not irresponsible. Perhaps it would be too much to claim that a government whose every act is criticized, whose lease of power is but from hour to hour, which must answer interpellations in Parliament regarding every rumor of its intended action, a government that never concludes a treaty or conducts an important negotiation without defending itself in public addresses or issuing a blue-book to secure the fuller expression of popular opinion,—it would be too much, I say, to claim that such a government did anything in the way of educating or making men, because, forsooth, it is an oligarchy and as such must content itself with the ignoble function of schooling the world in peace and order and making glad its desolate places. However this may be, I suggest that if it be our fate to undergo the threatened transformation, there is a fair chance that our days may be long in the land by way of partial compensation. Nor does a worse fate seem to be demonstrably in store for us. It is largely in the settlement of such questions as this that the British government has become strong and efficient. If we cannot learn efficiency in the same school it will be because we are made of poorer stuff, and if so we shall finally show it, whether we expand or not.

I cannot but regard the assumption of these objectors as otherwise significant and far more serious than they admit.

Can it be true that our government has not the capacity, present or potential, to deal efficiently with world problems? Are we unable to trust ourselves, or any whom we may designate from our number, with such discretionary power as that enjoyed by the English government in matters requiring promptness, decision and even occasional secrecy, without running the risk of cæsarism and the subversion of our liberties? Have we no hope of a decent civil service, an efficient army organization and a respectable diplomacy? Must we stay at home because we are not fit to go abroad? Such is the too frequent implication of these arguments. If such be our plight, which I, for one, do not believe, is there not need of something rather more radical than "minding our own business"? Are the nations that have best minded their own business, in this gratuitous sense of the term, the ones that have progressed most rapidly toward the attainment of high ideals? It is true, we have problems enough already to tax our wisdom and our patriotism to the utmost, but these problems are not lightened by isolation. Abuses intrench themselves in the consciousness of security, and governments grow rotten and impotent in prosperity and peace. Every new burden laid upon our civil service increases the demand for its purification; every responsibility from without heals a dissension within; and closer contact with foreign powers and foreign problems cannot but favor that knowledge and adaptation, on the development of which the ultimate unity must depend.

The changes which our new responsibilities seem likely to effect in our democracy are precisely those which our present conditions require. Efficiency requires that initiative and direction be in the hands of the few and that they be untrammelled; safety requires that these few be held strictly responsible. Government, to be successful under any form, must be by the will of the many and by the wisdom of the few. The advantage of democracy is that it better reconciles the will of the many with the wisdom of the few than any other form. Its danger lies in confusing the two *roles*, in failing to recognize the few who are competent to direct or in failing to retain their services. Then its representatives become puppets, not direct-

ing but waiting for directions, and by shirking initiative contriving to shirk responsibility.

If the policy of participation in world affairs involves dangers of conflict and disaster, no less does the policy of isolation. Our advantageous position between two seas offers no guarantee against ultimate aggression. A nation with a world commerce such as we certainly covet and expect, has interests as wide as the planet, and no one will effectually guard or adequately respect those interests if we are supine and impotent. To guard these interests we may not need war, but we shall certainly need readiness for it, readiness in arsenal and fleet, but above all readiness in the national temper. "They have rights who dare maintain them."

But the protection of our commerce is not the only interest which enjoins upon us the maintenance of a certain military efficiency. European nations have not recognized the Monroe Doctrine or guaranteed the independence of any portion of the American continent. Some of them confidently expect to get a foothold upon it. A single well-equipped nation established in South America in a favorable latitude and with a rapidly-multiplying population would soon control the whole. What that would mean to us it is not difficult to see. We may smile at such projects, and fancy that Europe will stand in awe of us, but nobody stands in awe of bigness. The time will come when we must choose between a more vigorous assertion and a complete abandonment of that policy upon which our much-prized isolation depends.

To those who are content with the forecast of a decade or a generation the following considerations will have little interest. But it is not for such that I write. Larger forecasts are necessary if we are in any degree to wisely modify the course of human events.

The balance of power in Europe, never more than a temporary expedient, is tottering to its fall. Half the countries that once composed it have sunk into insignificance, while dual and triple alliances are becoming more frequent and permanent, foreshadowing an inevitable consolidation. Not that states will become conquered provinces governed by pro-

consuls from London, Berlin or St. Petersburg, but some one power will acquire an ascendancy which will more and more influence and ultimately determine the action of the rest. Such ascendancy will doubtless be fluctuating and intermittent, changing perhaps more than once its headquarters from one capital to another. But that which is of concern to us is the possibility of even a temporary unification of Europe or of the Continental powers. I will not say that such a combination would be certain to injure us, but it is certain that it might do so, not necessarily by armed invasion but by checkmating us in matters of vital policy, as, for instance, in getting a foothold on this continent. How long is it since Mexico was occupied by such a coalition, and who will say that under other and perfectly possible circumstances, the occupation might not have been permanent? Anything like a stable unification of Europe, involving as it would the whole of the Old World, would eventually dictate terms to us. This might not be the worst of evils, but it is plain that such a supremacy of any people would tend to make it the leader and determiner of the world's culture as well as of its government. The customs, manners, ideals and language,—in a word, the civilization of such a directive centre, would have an enormous advantage over all others and would tend to become universal.

If we remain aloof, the world power can hardly fail to be a continental nation, presumably Russia, whose resources and capacity for growth will easily distance all competitors. Against Russian growth the other half of the Anglo-Saxon race will not permanently make headway, and the Saxon opposition, divided and ineffectual, will leave Russian civilization in the ascendant so far as political conditions can make it so. It may be said that this is no disaster, that eliminating our present feelings and habits from the problem, it is as well to have the world organized under Russian or even Mongolian ascendancy as under that of the Anglo-Saxon. Perhaps so, but I see no occasion for eliminating those feelings of love and enthusiasm for our civilization which are the common birthright of all peoples and the measure of their virility. There is the less reason for so doing because I belong to the potentially dominant

race; dominant beyond controversy, but upon one inexorable condition. That race must pursue a common policy, a policy of cautious but energetic self-assertion, neglecting no advantage, granting no concession, casting the weight of its undivided influence into every scale into which the interests of the common civilization enter ever so little. Every strategic point, military, industrial and cultural, must be occupied, habitable territory must be peopled and controlled. The coal fields and mines that condition the industry of the future must be acquired. The order and freedom of intercourse necessary for the fullest internal development and the strongest cohesion must be unremittingly sought. This policy will require great patience, forbearance and sagacity, but not more, I am persuaded, than the intelligence of England and America can muster. Of all possible combinations looking toward world dominion, this is the only one likely to secure a bloodless supremacy. From beginning to end it is most nearly identical with universal interests, unless indeed the civilization itself prove deficient in capacity for growth and adaptation, and on this point we may take our chances.

It will be apparent how little such a course is compatible with a policy of isolation, and how far from final such objections as those based on the present accidents of our government must appear in the light of such a possibility and such a necessity as now confronts us. If it be urged that it is too early to talk about such things, the reply is that it is not too early to be determining them by our action in critical moments. They must be considered now, if consideration is to have any effect on their ultimate decision.

I have said that the struggle between nations is of the essence of that process which is deeper than all ethical relations, and that such relations inhere solely where there is association, dependence and trust. We are commissioned by the most supreme of all authorities, the inexorable necessity of nature, to participate in the struggle where expediency may dictate, having a care only for the moral sentiments which rightly or wrongly urge their claims, and for such of those incipient moral relations between nations as are likely to have permanent

significance. In the case we have just been considering, these relations exist in the highest degree ever realized between independent powers. Not only are we bound to Great Britain by an extensive commerce and community of foreign interests, but we feel in the highest degree the sentiments that arise from conscious community of origin, speech, civilization, social and religious ideals. We have but to compare the friendship between England and America with that between Russia and France to appreciate how peculiar is the relation in question, and how heavy the moral obligation it involves. To prove recreant to that obligation would, as in moral relations between individuals, bring demoralization and disgrace. While the policy of expansion is primarily a question of expediency, it thus becomes in one most important connection a matter of sacred obligation.

Fortunately our policy in its essence is little determined by argument and deliberation. To the question, shall we hold aloof, we have yet to hear the most significant answer. *We cannot hold aloof.* The instincts which control the action of masses of men respond to appropriate stimuli with a regularity that suggests little dependence on argument and deliberation. The crisis came and we acted as our impulse dictated and then talked it over afterward. We have done so before and are likely to do so again. The consciousness of power as naturally expresses itself in self-assertion as the consciousness of weakness does in submission. Reason has vast influence in determining the details of the struggle, but scarce any in determining its essence. When the slumbering instincts of race unity and action are aroused, they brush aside the petty barriers of logic and pseudo-obligation without apology or hesitation. It behooves us who are compelled to recognize the supremacy of these instincts to remember that in the course of social evolution the instinct of dominion has been as constructive as that of moral obligation, and that the preservation of society and of moral relations themselves requires that this instinct should not become extinct.

H. H. POWERS.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.